Quarles established a public safety exception to Miranda (the "exception") which allows the admission of otherwise barred statements where police questioning is "necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public .... ." This article will discuss the application of the exception in the thirteen years since the Supreme Court decided Quarles. It will point out the limited degree to which courts have extended the exception beyond the bounds set forth by the Supreme Court. This article will also discuss a related exception for questioning in emergency situations involving hostages and other persons at risk.
I. BACKGROUND
Familiarity with the facts of Quarles are essential to understanding the scope of the exception. Shortly after midnight, a young woman approached a police patrol car and informed the officers that a man armed with a gun had just raped her. 6 She further informed the police that the suspect had entered a nearby supermarket. 7 The police entered the supermarket, spotted a man who matched the woman's description, and apprehended him after a brief pursuit.' The police handcuffed and frisked the suspect, Benjamin Quarles, who wore an empty holster but did not possess a gun. 9 One of the officers inquired as to the location of the gun, and Quarles told him where to find it, saying "the gun is over there.""° The police recovered the loaded gun where Quarles indicated it would be. 1 Quarles was subsequently charged with crimiThe use of collateral statements made in violation of Miranda has been held to be permissible at trial. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) . Specifically, statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be used for impeachment purposes (i.e., such statements may not be used substantively in the prosecution's case in chief, but may be used by the prosecution to impeach statements made by the defendant during direct examination). Id. at 224. In addition, the prosecution may use otherwise inadmissible statements to impeach statements made in response to proper cross examination. United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620, 627-28 (1980) . Statements in violation of the Miranda rule may also be used in grand jury proceedings, United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974) ; in sentencing proceedings, United States v. Schipani, 315 F. Supp. 253 (E.D.N.Y. 1970 ), affd, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970 ), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971 ; parole revocation hearings, United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970 ; and warrant applications, United States v. Patterson, 812 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1987 .
5 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659. 6 Id. at 651-52. [Vol. 2:63
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nal possession of a weapon. 2 The defendant sought to have his statement indicating the location of the gun, and the gun itself, suppressed.
1 3 The motion to suppress was granted by the trial court and upheld by the appellate courts of New York. 4 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the use of any statement obtained by compulsion against a defendant in a criminal case. 5 Miranda warnings serve to dispel a suspect's inherent compulsion to respond to police questioning while in custody. Miranda warnings must be given before a suspect answers questions during a custodial interrogation in order to admit his/her response into evidence at trial. 16 Under Miranda, Quarles' statement and the recovered gun were properly suppressed because the statement was obtained during a custodial interrogation conducted in violation of Miranda requirements.
17
The United States Supreme Court, however, granted New York State's petition for certiorari in Quarles and overturned the Court of Appeals' decision.
1 8 The statement and gun were deemed admissible under the public safety exception. 9 The Court indicated that the exception to Miranda would apply to police questions objectively necessary to protect either the police or the public from immediate danger. 16 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655. 17 Id. Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in Quarles, agreed with the majority in admitting the gun. She argued, however, that the defendant's statement as to where the gun was located should have been suppressed because " [t] he harm caused by failure to administer Miranda warnings relates only to admission of testimonial seif-incriminations, and the suppression of such incriminations should by itself produce the optimal enforcement of the Miranda rule." Id. at 669 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Furthermore, when an interrogation provides leads to other evidence it "does not offend the values underlying the Fifth Amendment privilege any more than the compulsory taking of blood samples, fingerprints, or voice exemplars, all of which may be compelled in an 'attempt to discover evidence that might be used to prosecute [a defendant] for a criminal offense." ' Id. at 671 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) ).
The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the question of whether physical evidence obtained as a result of a statement taken in violation of Miranda should be admitted into evidence, although the issue has been presented to the Court. See United States v. Patterson, 812 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1987 ), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 922 (1988 (holding that unwarned voluntary statements made after coerced statements were properly used in an affidavit for a search warrant).
18 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 660.
needed to neutralize the threat to public safety, they must then give the suspect Miranda warnings before engaging in further questioning. 21 The Quarles majority indicated that the exception is to be applied in emergency situations only. 22 Whether the exception is applicable depends upon a court's objective assessment of the facts facing the police officer at the moment of questioning. The analysis does not turn upon the officer's subjective motivation. 2 3 In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, found the majority's departure from Miranda "troubling" for several reasons. 24 First, Justice Marshall stated, "the majority proposes to protect the public's safety without jeopardizing the prosecution of criminal defendants. I find in this reasoning an unwise and unprincipled departure from our Fifth Amendment precedents." 25 He asserted that police, as a result of Quarles, could very questions which are the most crucial to their efforts to protect themselves and the public." Id. at 658 n.7. The Quarles Court distinguished the facts before it from those in Orozco v. Texas, 394 U. S. 324, 324-25 (1969) . Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 n.8. In Orozco, the Court suppressed statements made by a suspect concerning a gun used in a murder four hours earlier. Orozco, 394 U.S. at 324-25. Police surrounded the suspect and questioned him at length in his boardinghouse room in the middle of the night. Id. at 325.
According to Justice Rehnquist, Orozco and Quarles were consistently decided because:
In Orozco ... the questions about the gun were clearly investigatory; they did not in any way relate to an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger associated with the weapon. In short there was no exigency requiring immediate action by the officers beyond the normal need expeditiously to solve a serious crime. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 n.8. 
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Such a threat may arise when a weapon is inexplicably absent and police have substantial reason to believe it is in a place where it may be used by an innocent third party, or more importantly, where it may be used by a confederate of the suspect. 3 6 If the exception is applicable, police may inquire as to the location of weapons even after they arrest and handcuff the suspect.
7
Numerous questions were left unanswered by Quarles: should the exception apply to weapons other than guns? Should it apply to dangerous substances other than weapons? Should it apply if a substantial gap in time exists between the use or disposition of the weapon and the questioning? Should it apply to protect potential victims of crime or hostages involved in ongoing crimes? How great must the danger be to trigger applications of the exception? Must the weapon be in a public place or may the exception be applied in private homes? Have the concerns of the Quarles dissent become reality?
II. THE UNANSWERED QUARLES QUESTIONS
A. Can Police Routinely Ask a Suspect if He or She Is Armed With a Gun?
In Quarles, the police arrested a suspect alleged to have been armed while committing a rape. 3 When arrested, Quarles wore an empty holster but had no gun.° It was reasonable for the police to believe that he had disposed of the weapon in the brief time between the rape and his apprehension. It was also reasonable for police to inquire as to the location of the gun. Other jurisdictions have denied motions to suppress statements based on equally compelling facts (e.g., a likelihood that a person was armed or a weapon was nearby). o 36 The Quarles Court indicated that "[s]o long as the gun was concealed somewhere in the supermarket, with its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously posed more than one danger to the public safety: an accomplice might make use of it, a customer or employee might later come upon it." Id. at 657. the police arrested and handcuffed Ronayne after he made a cocaine sale." Upon police inquiry, he directed them to his gun located in the pocket of his jacket which had come off during a struggle with the police.
4 " The police clearly had the right to search Ronayne pursuant to a lawful arrest, including hisjacket. In Ronayne the court failed to articulate the precise circumstances where the public's safety was compromised, but then permitted the pre-Miranda questioning. Was it objectively reasonable for the court to assume that all alleged drug dealers may be armed? The court in United States v. Edwards 4 5 suggests that it was.
In Edwards, the Seventh Circuit held that the exception allowed police to ask a suspect arrested for selling drugs if he was armed." 6 The court reasoned that drug dealers pose a danger to arresting officers because they "are known to arm themselves, particularly when making a sale . . .47 (7th Cir. 1993 ) (person stopped for speeding had ammunition in his pocket); United States v. Lawrence, 952 F.2d 1034 (8th Cir. ), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1011 (1992) (gun thrown away while suspect was being pursued); United States v. Knox, 950 F.2d 516 (8th Cir. 1991) (suspect's jacket contained a loaded magazine for a .38 caliber pistol); People v. Melvin, 591 N.Y.S.2d 454 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1992) (numerous people were present at scene of shooting where man admitted to shooting the deceased and police asked the location of the gun).
In United States v. Johnson, No. 90-50676, 1993 WL 114861 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 1993 ) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 882 (1993 , police questions about weapons were held to fall within the exception. Although the police had no indication thatJohnson was armed or had recently been armed, the court found Quarles applicable on the grounds that Johnson was in a high crime area, at a late hour, near an open liquor store, and appeared as if he was about to be involved in a robbery. Id. at *1-*2. See Stauffer v. Zavaris, 37 F.3d 1495 (10th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion) (holding that pre-Miranda questions regarding weapons were deemed proper under Quarles where suspect fled from a car containing two holsters and one handgun on the front seat); State v. Lopez, 652 A.2d 696, 698 (N.H. 1994 ) (the exception applied where suspect in two shootings, which occurred within a short time of arrest, was wearing an empty shoulder holster when arrested 
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United States v. Brutzman 48 provides the clearest example of the exception's expansion. In Brutzman, ten police officers executed a search warrant of the home and office of Warren Brutzman, a convicted felon, who was suspected of mail and wire fraud arising from a telemarketing business. 4 9 One of the ten officers asked Brutzman if there was a weapon on the premises.
50 Brutzman disclosed that there was a shotgun in the closet.
1
In essence, because Brutzman was a convicted felon, the statement and shotgun were admitted at trial and the questioning at the scene was proper. Despite the overwhelming presence of police at the scene, the fact that the police had no reason to believe Brutzman was armed and that the purpose of the search was to locate evidence of mail and wire fraud, not weapons, the appellate court found the question permissible under Quarles. 52 The statement made in response to pre-Mirandized questioning was instrumental in convicting Brutzman of felonious possession of a firearm. Initially, Quarles was limited to situations where particular facts led officers to believe that a threat to public safety existed. Ronayne, Brutzman, and DeSantis encourage police to routinely ask suspects whether they are armed. Such routine questioning represents a clear expansion of the exception. These decisions, in effect, have labeled virtually any situation a threat to public safety. 187 (N.C. 1990) (court, under Quarles, permitted question about existence and location of weapons because officer testified that, in his experience, people are armed in at least 85% of drug transactions).
48 No. 93-50839, 1994 WL 721798 (9th Cir. Dec. 28, 1994 55 Id. at 539. Similarly, in Fleming v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1992 , the police responded to a bank's silent alarm. Id. at 1110. Prior to confirming that a robbery had taken place, the police observed two men in a field, one holding a pistol, and the other bent over on the ground holding his wounded arm. Id. at 1110-11. The police did not know how the wounded man had been shot, whether he was a crime victim or suspect, or about the nearby bank robbery at which a robber was shot and had escaped. Id. at 1111, 1114. Yet the court concluded it was proper to ask the wounded man about the location of his gun. Id. at 1114.
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B. Does the Exception Apply to Questions Concerning Other Weapons, Drugs, Needles, and Other Suspects?
Courts have extended the exception to allow questioning about weapons other than guns, drugs, and hypodermic needles. For example, although Quarles involved an officer's inquiry as to the location of a gun, the courts have found pre-Miranda questions appropriate that seek to procure the location of a knife. In United States v. Carrillo, 5 7 the police asked a suspected drug seller, before conducting an inventory search, whether "he had any drugs or needles on his person." 5 8 The trial court found his response, "[n]o, I don't use drugs, I sell them," admissible.
5 9 The appellate court affirmed, finding an objectively reasonable need to protect officers from needle pricks or skin irritations resulting from drug contact. 6 " Thus Carillo justifies a routine pre-search, pre-Miranda, inquiry as to possession of drugs or drug paraphernalia. Such questioning is appropriate regardless of the existence of facts suggesting that the suspect used drugs or was carrying them. This ruling should be narrowed to apply only to instances involving arrested drug sellers or to instances where police reasonably fear that the suspect has drugs or needles on his person.
However, in United States v. Cox, 61 the Fourth Circuit applied an even broader rule, permitting questions as to drug use. The court in Cox stated that the exception permitted police to ask a suspect if he was a heroin user after a search uncovered drug resi-56 People v. Cole, 211 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (Quarles applicable where, following report that a man attempted a kidnapping by holding a knife to a victim's throat, police chased and caught the suspect and immediately asked him the location of his knife); Ohio v. Jergens, No. 13294, 1993 WL 333649 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 3, 1993 (the exception applies where, the day after his wife's death, a suspect in the stalking murder was asked, upon arrest, about the location of the knife used in the murder); see also State v. Deases, 518 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1994) (the court found Quarles inapplicable to police questioning of stabbing suspect as to where he obtained the knife used because officers were already in possession of the knife, not because the weapon was something other than a gun).
57 16 F.3d 1046 16 F.3d (9th Cir. 1994 due and paraphernalia in the suspect's car. 6 2 The Cox court found the inquiry reasonable because drug users often act irrationally, and, therefore, pose a threat to police officers' safety. 6 3 Questioning to secure public safety may also refer to matters other than weapons or drugs. For example, in State v. Leone, 64 the court permitted questions as to the location of a wounded police officer, 6 5 and the person whom Leone claimed had shot the officer. 66 Leone's statements were deemed voluntary since police did not draw their guns and did not apply physical force. 6 7 The trial court found that Leone exercised his rational intellect and free will in making these statements. 68 The court further noted that Leone made unsolicited statements that someone else had shot a police officer, and that he stated to one officer "go ahead and pull the trigger if you're man enough. 69 In sum, Quarles has been extended to pre-Miranda questions involving drugs, 7 " drug paraphernalia, 7 1 drug use, 7 2 and the location of a wounded officer and the shooter of that officer. 7 3
C. Does Quarles Apply Only to Public Places?
Although the exception applies to threats to safety in a public place, 4 the Quarles rationale logically allows questioning any time 62 Id. at *4. 63 Id. at *9. 64 581 A.2d 394 (Me. 1990). 65 Id. at 396. The trial court suppressed these answers as being involuntary products of police coercion, in violation of the Fifth Amendment because the arresting officers obtained these statements after pounding Leone's head on the ground several times, aiming a gun at his head, and threatening to kill him. Id. 66 Id. at 397. The court reasoned that the circumstances of an armed man threatening police, an officer's telephone message that he had been shot, and the inability of the officers to find their wounded fellow officer in dense woods made it "reasonable ... to ask Leone if he was alone and about the gun.... After Leone's later statement that another person had shot Officer Payne, it was also reasonable for the officers to inquire about the identity of that other person." Id. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 598 A.2d 784, 785 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (police chased three suspected armed robbers into a museum complex and caught two of them; it was held proper to ask one of the arrested men where the third anned man was). In United States v. Raborn, 872 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1989) , the Fifth Circuit explained its reasoning for finding Quarles inapplicable. In Raborn, police conducting a drug surveillance of a building in an isolated rural area engaged in a car chase of a truck leaving the building. Id. at 592. Seven officers stopped the vehicle. Id. One of the occupants wore a holster with a gun in it. Id. He removed the gun and placed it somewhere in the vehicle. Id. The police required all of the occupants to exit. Id. The occupants were arrested and the police searched for the gun but did not find it. Id. The police asked the man with the empty holster where the gun was located and he told them. Id. The appellate court concluded that the exception did not justify the question asked because "the gun was [not] hidden in a place to which the public had access. Raborn's truck, where the police officers believed the gun to be, had already been seized and only the police officers had access to the truck." Id. at 595. Quarles was inapplicable, not because the truck was in a place inaccessible to the public, but rather, because the gun presented no danger to anyone-public or police. Id. The gun was properly admitted because it would inevitably have been discovered during the police inventory search of the truck. Id.
Several courts have stressed that the exception requires questioning related to a danger occurring in a place accessible to the public. 8 2 Although there is language in Quarles that supports this argument, 3 it is not consistent with the reasoning of Quarles, which should logically allow questioning to protect police officers or others present at the scene of an arrest regardless of whether it occurs in a public or a private place.
D. Does Quarles Apply After Giving a Suspect Miranda Warnings?
The exception allows for the introduction at trial of statements and related evidence obtained by inquiring of individuals in police custody despite the failure of police to give Miranda warnings before asking questions. 8 4 In addition, some courts have applied Quarles to allow questioning of individuals about public safety who had already received, but had not waived, their Miranda rights. App. 1993) , the police arrested a suspect who, moments earlier, threatened several people with a rifle. Id. at 34. The suspect, pursued by police, entered a partly occupied, unlocked, somewhat derelict, apartment building. Id. at 34-35. After arrest, the suspect responded to a question about the location of the weapon. Id. at 35. The court found that the weapon was in a place accessible to the public in accordance with Quarles. Id. at 36. Some apartments were occupied, the building's front door was unlatched, and vagrants used the building. Id. at 37. In Wisconsin v. Hoag, No. 92-2523 -CR, 1993 WL 245669 (Wisc. Ct. App. May 12, 1993 ) (unpublished opinion), the court recognized that the exception "would not apply in a situation where there is an area readily accessible to the public and there is no exigency requiring immediate police action." Id. at *3 n.3 (citations omitted). Nevertheless, the Hoag court held that Quarles applied to the questioning of a suspect in an armed bank robbery who no longer had the gun used in the robbery and who had been pursued by a citizen from the bank to a wooded area. Id. at *1. 83 In Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 n.8, the Supreme Court distinguished Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) , in which the questioning of the suspect occurred at his boardinghouse in the middle of the night with armed officers asking numerous questions regarding a murder and whether the arrestee owned a gun. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 n. 8 (1984) . Orozco is distinguishable from Quarles beyond whether the site of the questioning was a public or private place. The questioning in Orozco was extended and concerned the crime, not merely the location of the gun. Because Orozco was arrested a mere four hours after the murder, logically, brief questioning of Orozco solely regarding the location of the gun used in the murder would have been proper under Quarles. 84 In United States v. DeSantis, Rocco DeSantis had been arrested at his home, pursuant to a warrant, and requested to speak to counsel. 8 9 The police accompanied a partially clothed DeSantis to his bedroom so he could dress. 9 " An officer asked him if there were any weapons in the bedroom.
1 DeSantis stated that there was a gun and identified its location. 9 2 The officer seized the weapon. The trial court denied DeSantis' subsequent motion to suppress his statement and the recovered gun. 9 " The Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the officer had an objectively reasonable basis to fear for his safety in DeSantis' bedroom.
9 4 Thus, the Quarles exception was applicable despite DeSantis' invocation of his right to counsel.
5
By contrast, in People v. Laliberte, 96 the Illinois Appellate Court held it was improper for police to ask further questions of an arrestee who repeatedly asked for an attorney. 97 In that case police suspected Laliberte of kidnapping a one-year-old child and abandoning her in the woods. 9 8 The court rejected the state's argument that the danger to the child justified evidentiary use of the defendant's answers to questions asked after he had been Mirandized and then requested to speak to counsel. 
E. Have Courts Created New Exceptions to Miranda?
The Quarles dissent, as well as numerous critical commentators, expressed concern that Quarles created an exception to the previous "bright line" rule of Miranda, which banned the use of compelled statements.
1 0 0 The exception, it is feared, could lead to the creation of other exceptions to Miranda. However, this concern has not been realized in the thirteen years since Quarles was decided. It is true that several courts have utilized a "rescue doctrine"'' exception to Miranda to permit questioning of suspects in situations involving hostages or kidnapped persons. However, these cases logically fall under Quarles because they include a substantial threat to someone's safety and involve emergency situations.1 0 2
Another new exception to Quarles may be found where courts have ruled that police are permitted to ask questions in order to "clarify the nature of the situation" they face.'° For example, in REv. 989, 992-93 (1988) .
101 The "rescue doctrine" was developed primarily by California courts to allow into evidence a suspect's responses to police questioning in situations in which the suspect has not received Miranda warnings and the police undertake the interrogation for the purpose of saving a life. The doctrine was first announced pre-Miranda in People v. Modesto, 398 P.2d 753 (Cal. 1965) 937 (1979) . The Riddle court indicated that the rescue doctrine, also known as the "private safety" doctrine, applied in situations where (1) there was an urgent need for the information which could not be obtained in any other way; (2) the possibility existed of saving a human life by rescuing a person whose life is in danger; and (3) the rescue is the primary purpose and motive behind the interrogation. Id. at 576. The doctrine has been adopted by other jurisdictions as well. See State v. Kunkel, 404 N.W.2d 69 (Wis. 1987 ), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 929 (1987 State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93 (Minn. 1992 ), cert. denied sub nom. Provost v. Minnesota, 507 U.S. 929 (1993 United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir. 1989) .
The private safety exception is much more narrow than the Quarles exception. The danger must involve a threat to a specific person's life rather than a general threat to public safety. The police, when acting in accordance with the private safety exception, must have a subjective intention to rescue the person in danger, whereas the Quarles test is an objective one. The private safety exception requires that the information be unavailable by any other means, whereas the Quarles exception does not.
102 The rescue doctrine is necessary only if Quarles is limited to situations involving threats to public safety. Given that the basic rationale of Quarles does not justify such a limitation, there is probably no need for the rescue doctrine. Regardless of the nature of the threat to safety, whether to a particular individual or to the public in general, the Quarles objective approach should be favored in determining whether there was a threat to safety which permitted the questioning of a suspect without receiving Miranda warnings, and whether the scope of the questioning was limited to that which was necessary to protect safety interests. Nevertheless, some courts have continued to reject the rescue doctrine. See, e.g., Laliberte, 615 N.E.2d and permitted officers at the scene of an arrest to ask questions designed to clarify the situation confronting them. 
F. Does the Exception Apply if There is a Gap in Time Between the Use of a Weapon and the Arrest?
In Quarles, police inquired as to the weapon's location a few minutes after it was allegedly used.
1 ' However, the exception has been properly applied to inquiries about weapons where there existed a gap in time between the suspect's alleged possession of the weapon and the police questioning. 137 In a limited number of cases, courts have improperly admitted into evidence answers to numerous investigatory questions. The most serious example of such an erroneous application of the exception occurred in Fleming v. Collins. 13 In Fleming, after responding to a bank alarm, police questioned a man they observed in a field holding a pistol over another man. 1 " 9 Police approached, ordered the man to drop his gun, and ordered both men to put their hands up.' 4° Fleming, the man on the ground, stated that he could not raise his arm because he had been shot. 4 ' The officer asked who shot him, 14 2 and the suspect said it was the man at the bank.' 4 3 At that point, the officers realized that Fleming was a suspect in the bank robbery and that the other man was merely an armed bystander who followed Fleming from the bank and captured him. 4 The officer continued to inquire as to who was with Fleming, the location of the guns and whether anyone at the bank was shot.' 4 5 The trial court admitted Fleming's answers to all the questions and the appellate court affirmed.' 4 6
The appellate court in Fleming found that the Quarles exception permitted all of the questions because the officers initially did not know the location of the accomplices or whether Fleming was a victim of a crime or a suspect.
14 7 The majority opinion asserted that Quarles was satisfied because the questioning ended once Fleming stated that he had acted alone. 4 ' The majority chose to look at the situation as a whole to discover whether the danger permitted pre-Mirandized questioning. 14 9 The dissent, in contrast, concluded that the safety concerns were satisfied once the police pect the number and whereabouts of other robbers not yet apprehended); Hill v. State, 598 A.2d 784, 785 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (the court allowed a question asked of a suspected armed robber regarding the location of another armed participant in the robbery who had just evaded arrest).
138 954 F.2d 1109 954 F.2d (5th Cir. 1992 147 Id. at 1113. The officers had already frisked Fleming so they knew he was no longer armed. Id. at 1115. 148 The majority opinion quotes from the officer's suppression hearing testimony, which includes this testimony rather than the trial testimony. Id. at 1111, 1114-15. The dissent points out that the suppression hearing testimony was never heard by the trial jury but that, of course, the trial testimony was. Id. at 1114.
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knew that Fleming was fleeing from a bank robbery, had dropped his gun, and was not armed. 1 5° Thus, the dissent argued that the officer's continued questioning was improper.
15
Quarles requires that the questioning cease and Miranda rights be read as soon as the threat to public safety ends. Therefore, the majority in Fleming erred by permitting all five minutes of questioning to be admitted. Once the safety concerns were alleviated, Fleming should have been Mirandized. The Fleming dissent reasoned consistently with Quarles by approving the questioning directed at public safety and disapproving the use of answers to questions no longer necessary to secure the public safety. Accordingly, all of Fleming's statements made after it was clear that no threat to the public safety existed should have been suppressed.
III. CONCLUSION
In creating an exception to Miranda, the Quarles Court articulated a narrow set of circumstances in which police officers are permitted to engage in pre-Miranda questioning. The exception allows questioning of suspects before they are informed of their Miranda rights whenever a court may objectively conclude that officers are faced with a situation endangering the police or the public safety. However, subsequent trial and appellate court decisions have implemented Quarles in ways inconsistent with its rationale. Police officers may now question suspects where dangers arise from the presence of guns, or other weapons, drugs or drug paraphernalia, as to the possible presence of other suspects or crime victims and where questioning will result in searches beyond the scope of a valid search warrant. In addition, Quarles may be applied regardless of whether the danger exists in a private or public setting.
Questions permitted by Quarles have generally been limited to those designed to protect against danger to the public or to police, and no further questioning has been permitted without providing the warnings required by Miranda. Perhaps the greatest and most unwarranted expansion of the exception involves court approval of the practice of questioning suspects as to the location of weapons or drugs regardless of whether there exists an objective reason to believe that the particular suspect possessed or used same. These 150 Id. at 1115. 151 Id. According to the dissenting judges, Quarles never intended to allow police questioning of this type: "How many thousands of unfortunate persons in totalitarian countries have confessed at the end of the loaded barrel of a gun held by police officers, whether or not they were guilty?" Id.
